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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Conceptions of personal responsibility detennine both the existence of 
human laws and the impositions of sanctions for transgressions. Such 
attributions of responsibility would seem to require impartiality on the part 
of the judges. Given a group of individuals asked to determine the respon-
sibility of a person for a certain action, one would like to determine both 
the presence and the degree of aey subjective biases entering into such a 
judgment. 
Attribution theory concerns the process by which an individual 
interprets events 11as being caused by particular parts of the relatively 
stable enviromnent 11 (Heider, 1958, p. 297). Attribution refers to the 
in the environment. Kelley's (1967) interpretation says that attribution of 
behavior t.o one or another causal source (one's self or the environment, 
personal idiosyncracies or the objective requirements of the situation, and 
the like) will often require social comparisons. To be able to tell whether 
one's judgments, beliefs, or opinions are objectively right, it may be 
necessary to compare one 1 s beliefs with the beliefs of others. We usually 
, describe people by the acts they do. "The perceiver seeks to find sufficient 
reason why the person acted and why the act took on a particular form" 
(Jones & Davis, 1965, p. 220) • Heider points out that the attribution of 
personal responsibility involves a decision as to which of the several I conditions of action--the intentio~ of a person, personal. power, or 
(- __ z_,,,..._.,._,., ___ ,..,. ___ ,_~--·"' ,,,,_ 
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environmental factors--is to be given primary weight for the actual outcome. 
In general, the mre enviromnental factors are thought to influence the 
action, the less the person is held responsible for an action with which he 
is connected. 
In the case where the person is concerned with the dispositional. 
properties of his surrounding enciromnent, the choice is between external 
(environ.'llent) attribution and internal {self) attribution. Kelley (1967) 
holds that attribution to the external stinrulus instead of the self requires 
that the individual respond differentially to the stimulus, that the same 
individual responds consistently, over time and modality, and that the 
individual responds in agreement with an opinion of another person's 
responses to it. The analysis of the attribution process proposed by 
1965) in that both derive from Reider's work. However, Jones and Davis 
were concerned with the circumstances under which an actor is seen as the 
cause of given effects, whereas Kelley was concerned with attribution to the 
environment. It can be said, however, that both theories complement each 
other. 
Attribution of responsibility for an accident 
Attribution of responsibility for an accident is an issue that has 
stimulated much recent research. Walster (1966) hypothesized that there is 
a tendency to try to assign responsibility to someone when we hear about an 
accident and that people attribute more responsibility when the conse-
quences of the accident ~come more serious. Her data supported this 
hypothesis and were interpreted in terms of defensive attribution. 
a..------·----------• _,_., ____ .. ,_:1.,....,.a,~~1ii;u M!lll• JP'l;_,_..,.,.,_t•-·--·-·-•~-•-• ---·--·-~-~--...t 
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According to Walster, the realization that life could be profoundly affected 
by chance happenings over which one has no control is very threatening to 
JIK)St individuals. Therefore, a perceiver attributes more responsibility to 
a victim or perpetrator in a serious relative to a less serious accident to 
protect himself from acknowledging the fact that he could ever be involved 
in such an unfortunate event. Walster (1966) presented subjects with a 
taped description of a stimulus person and the accident in which his 
vehicle was involved. In the first two condi_tions, the person's car 
received either inconsequential or considerable damage when it rolled down-
hill after being parked on a street •. In the ~hird condition, other people 
fortuitously escaped harm and in the fourth condition these people were 
seriously injured by the rolling automobile. Both male and female subjects 
assigned JIK)re responsibility to the owner when the consequences of the 
accident in terms of damage to the automobile were serious rather than 
minor. Males attributed ioore responsibility to the stimulus person when 
other people were actually injured than when they were only exposed to 
danger; females attributed the same degree of responsibility to the driver 
of the automobile in both personal injury conditions. Greater seriousness 
of outcome did not, however, result in the subject's attributing greater 
carelessness to behavior prior to the accident. SUbjects did advocate li'X>re 
rigorous safety measures when the consequences were ioore serious. 
In a second paper, Walster (1967) reported two experiments in which a 
stimulus person, in a taped interview, described the decision alternatives 
and risks involved in a real estate purchase, the aim of which was 
financial gain. The final course of action taken by this individual and 
________ • ..,..... • •12• _.,..._, ______ ....,. ________________ _ 
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the actual outcome were also revealed in printed material prior to the 
presentation of the taped interview. SUbjects in these experiments expressed 
m:>re confidence that they themselves would have foreseen the actual outcome 
as the consequences, both negative and positive, became m:>re serious. How-
ever, contrary to the original experiment, greater personal responsibility 
was not attributed to the stimulus person as the outcomes became more 
serious. In fact, in one of' the experiments attributed responsibility 
decreased with seriousness of outcome, while in the other, there was no 
consistent relationship. 
Severa.]. other attempts were made to replicate Walster's (1966) 
original findings. Shaver (l970a, 1970b), Shaver and Carroll (1970), Shaw 
and Skolnick (1971), and Crinklaw and Vidmar (1971) have all failed to 
reproduce the origin.al £itililig1:;. 
Shaver (1970a) believes that the more relevant a negative outcome, the 
more a perceiver is forced to find ways of denying that he could ever be 
blamed for his involvement in a similar accident. He proposed an 
alternative conceptuallzation of defensive attribution. According to this 
f'onuulation, the real discomfort experienced by the perceiver when he 
confronts a serious accident is the realization that he could at some time 
be blamed by others for his involvement in a similar accident. To protect 
h.i.mself from acknowledging this possibility, a perceiver attributes less 
personal responsibility to the individual involved in an accident as the 
outcoma;; of a mishap become more serious. But unfortunately his data did 
the perception or justice or injustice in a situation and it is closely tied 
to.the process or ascribing causality or blame for the fates of the people 
inVolved. He believes that an individual's concern with justice and 
injustice may influence the way he explains to himself' the causalities of 
important outcomes in his environment. Because human beings wish to .feel 
secure, most people pref er to believe tha·t others earn their misfortunes, 
instead of attributing the causes to mysterious .factors beyond their control. 
Peca use maI\1 times people need to feel secure in their own world they may 
assign blame to someone else. Lerner asserts that in effect people say, 
"It can happen to others, but not to me.:: In a oore general manner it could 
be said that people will arrange their cognitions so as to maintain the 
belief that people get what they deserve, or, deserve what they get. This 
point. has Deen macte ey otner psychologists. !''or examp.Le, tte1aer (1958) has 
mted the tendency to perceive misfortune as pmti.shment: the harm that 
befalls a person is deserved and therefore ought to happen to him. Lerner 
and Sinnn.ons (1966) found support for their major hypothesis that "rejection 
is the product of the observer's attempt to maintain his belief in a just 
world." 
The role of s:im:ilarity 
Shaver (1970a) makes an analysis of the concept of "relevance" and 
reveals at least two major classes of contributing factors: those 
associated with situational similarity and those associated with personal 
similarity. The first one refers to perceived similarities between the 
circumstances of the stimulus person and the subject. In contrast, the 
second one which is personal similarity refers to the perceived congruence 
~._.. _ _...._,.....__ ____________ =-·-v~-·-•-m.----._..-....._,,__..-.._,___... _ ____,.__ ____ ~. 
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of beliefs, values, and personal characteristics between the stimulus person 
and the subject. Situational similarity would appear to be necessary :f'or 
arousal of the self-protective tendency. It can be illustrated by pointing 
out that a crash of a military jet aircraft would be of almost no importance 
to an average female college student, but it would be quite threatening to 
another military pilot. He would feel less secure since an accident did 
happen to someone similar to him. The ac cldent was, therefore, relevant 
and the pilot must make some cognitive effort to protect himself. Once the 
self-protective tendency was aroused by situational similarity, differences 
in judgment might be produced by different degrees of personal. similar l ty. 
If this assumption is a valid one, this may be the reason why Walster (1967) 
was unable to replicate her earlier work. The ~ubjects in the latter 
exfie::r.'i.me.at e.A.pl't:~::>~u mor·e confidence that they, themselves, would have 
foreseen the actual outcome as the consequences, both negative and positive, 
became more extreme (serious). Thus, contrary to the original experiment 
greater responsibility was not attributed to the stimulus person as the 
outcomes became more extreme. 
Shaver (1970a, 1970b) conducted five experiments using the last two 
conditions of Walster's (1966) original study, possible versus actual injury 
to other people. SUbjects were instructed to make individual jury 
decisions on the basis of pieces of evidence or testimony, presumably to be 
used as baseline data for a jury study. None of these studies round 
significant differences in attribution of responsibility between minor and 
I serious accident conditions, although less responsibility was attributed 
I when the stimulus person carried insurance which compensated the injured 
L-·~·---··~ .... - --··· .. ---*·-.. ----
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victim (Shaver, 1970b). In these experiments Shaver made an attempt to 
replicate Walster's (1966) findings, but his procedure was slightly 
different. Subjects were attributing responsibility as part of a jury study 
and no attempt was made to prevent involvement with the victim. Walster's 
results again were not replicated. Shaver (1970a) hypothesized that these 
failures at replication might be due to differences in perceived similarity 
to the victim by the subjects. 
As a matter of fact, Shaver (1970a) found that the more the perceived 
similarity between the subject and the stimulus person, the less the respon-
sibility assigned for the mishap. In these experiments subjects perceived 
the victim to be more similar in the severe consequences rather than in the 
mild consequences condition, therefore, attributing less rasponsibility. No 
was led to theorize that the attribution process was more complex than 
Wal.star had indicated. When the circumstances surrounding an accident or 
the victim of an accident are sufficiently similar to the subject, defensive 
attribution will take place. When the victim is seen as different by the 
subject, he can easily be blamed for the accident. However, when the victim 
is seen as similar by the subject, the subject can no longer be assured that 
his own behavior would not have similar consequences in that particular 
situation. The accident is seen as being externally caused thus making the 
attribution of responsibility to the victim less correspondent. The subject 
is not seeking to avoid the consequences of the acci.dent as Walster had 
theorized but rather is seeking to avoid blame for those consequences. 
Since the subject cannot differentiate himself from the victim, the victim 
a· 
must not be responsible for the accident. subjects in Experiment II (Shaver, 
1970a) imagined either that they were very similar to the victim or that 
they were very dissimilar from him. Following the line of thinking of t.he 
defensive attribution hypothesis, imaged-similar victims were rated as 
significantly less responsible for an accident than imaged-different victims. 
In the same line of research and following the suggestion made by Shaver 
(1970a) that similarity between the perceiver and the victim of an accident 
will lessen the attribution of responsibility to the victim for the 
accident, McKillip (1972) controlled behavioral similarity and found that 
subjects who smoked marijuana attributed lower responsibility for a serious 
accident to a victim who himself snX>ked marijuana than to a victim whose 
behavior was not similar. McKillip's results were interpreted as supporting 
the ueftm.s.i.vt:i a\,l:..dbu.ilion anal;yi:>i1:1 by Sh&.-ve:;; (1770a). whein att .. :ributing 
responsibility to a person who has a serious accident, the subject is 
threatened by a high degree of similarity to this victim. If the victim 
were different, the subject could attribute high responsibility believing 
that he, himself, would be more careful and thus would avoid the accident. 
Since this self-defensiveness is not possible when the subject and the 
victim are in fact similar, the subject tends to attribute the cause of the 
accident to chance, thus lessening the attributed responsibility. In a 
later study by McKillip and Posavac (1972), a similarity by severity of 
consequences interaction was found; attribution of responsibility was 
greater for the similar victim than for the d:i.ff arent victim in the m:iJ.d 
I accident condition. They interpreted the outcome saying that it may be that I in _:i:.:'.::_=nstanc::_~ •~ctim of a mild, but potentially harmful, J 
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accident is viewed as lucky. 
Most studies of attribution of responsibility have used only one actor 
who was both victim and perpetrator (Crinklaw & Vidmar, 1971; Walster, 
1966). In those which employed two actors, only perceived similarity to 
the perpetrator was measured (McKillip, 1972; Shaver, 1970a). In the 
present experiment, subjects were asked to judge the responsibility of a 
driver and of a pedestrian involved in an accident when the two were known 
to be attitudinally similar or dissimilar to the judges. In addition, the 
severity of the accident was varied. 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were suggested: 
1. less responsibility will be attributed to the similar 
in the severe accident condition. 
2. Less responsibility will be attributed to the similar 
driver than to the dissimilar driver, especially 
in the severe accident condition. 
3. If the above hypotheses are supported, compensation 
given to the pedestrian should be greater when the 
driver is dissitr.ilar and the pedestrian similar than 
when the driver is similar and pedestrian dissimilar. 
Compensation should be higher in the severe accident 
compared to the mild accident condition. 
The effects of sex of the subjects on judgmen~s of :responsibility 
have not been explored, although sex differences have been reported {e.g., 
10 
Walster, 1966). While no hypotheses concerning sex differences were 
suggested, the design of the present study permitted an examination of some 
dif'f erences between the judgments of fem.ales and males. 
subjects 
CHAPTER Il 
MFTHOD 
Subjects were 96 volunteers, 48 females and 48 males, who were enrolled 
in sUI1111er school psychology classes at I..oyola University of Chicago. Data 
were collected for 127 subjects in all; eight females and nine males did 
not meet the quaJ.ifications mentioned below, and 14 protocols, nine females 
and five males, were randomly dropped to equalize the number of subjects in 
the treatments. This was done, of course, before the dependent measures 
were coded or analyzed. 
Stimulus materials 
F.ach subject was presented with a booklet divided into three sections. 
The first ~onte.ined a brief' int!'Oducticn t-o th.e e~e!'i!?!ent :1 a. descr:!..pticn 
of the accident, a selection of six attitudes attributed to the driver of 
the accident, and six attitudes attributed to the pedestrian of the accident. 
The second section consisted of nine questions regarding the accident in 
which the subject was asked to indicate his or her judgment regarding the 
degree to which the driver or victim was responsible for the accident. The 
last section of the booklet was a questionnaire containing 60 attitude items 
which included the 12 selected for the similarity manipulations. 
The cover sheet of the booklet informed the subjects that they were 
·participating in a study of jury functioning, and that they would be given 
part of an actual case report. The subjects were asked to read the 
information very carefully and report their judgments on the scales which 
ll 
12' 
would follow. 
Manipulation of accident severity. The second page of the booklet 
contained the manipulation of the severity of the accident. In the severe 
condition the following information was given to fe:male subjects: 
Mary B. was driving her car on her way to college. She was 
not in a hurry, she was driving at a moderate speed. Traffic 
at that time was light, the weather was clear, and visibility 
was good. Suddenly Ann c., also a local college student, 
stepped from between two parked cars and into the path of Mary's 
car. Immediately Mary stepped on her brakes in an attempt to 
avoid hitting Ann. However, Mary did not stop fast enough and 
she hit Ann. Ann was taken to the hospital in an ambulance 
where X-rays revealed that her right leg was broken. She was 
also treated for cuts and bruises and remained in the hospital 
for ten days. 
For the mild accident condition, the second page of the booklet given 
to fe:males was the following: 
Mary B. was driving her car on her way to co.J..Lege. She was 
not in a hurry, she was driving at a moderate speed. Traffic 
at that time was light, the weather was clear, and visibility 
was good. SUddenly Ann c., also a local college student, 
stepped from between two parked cars and into the path of ~.ary's 
car. Immediately Mary stepped on her brakes in an attempt to 
avoid hitting Ann. However, ¥..ary did not stop fast enough and 
she hit Ann. Ann was taken to the hospital in a police car 
where X-rays revealed no bone damage. After Ann was treated 
for bruises on her right leg, she went home under her own 
power. 
The mild and severe accident reports administered to mB.les were exactly 
the same, except that the names of Mary and Ann were changed to Jack and 
Paul, respectively. 
Manipulation of similarity. The third page of the test booklet 
presented a rationale for giving the subjects information about the 
·attitudes of the driver and attitudes of the pedestrian in the following 
manner: 
____ J 
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In order to help you make a fair judgment of this case, it is 
necessary for you to know something of the character of the 
persons involved. It has been shown that a synopsis of 
attitudes on a number of important topics helps subjects to 
formulate more accurate impressions. On the following two 
sheets of paper, then, are two sets of opinions held by 
the driver or by the pedestrian. The i terns have been selected 
to be r!?Presentative of the attitudes of each person, even 
though they are only a small sample of each one's total 
opinions. Guided by this knowledge, please answer the 
questions about the driver and those about the pedestrian. 
The fourth and fifth pages contained two sets of attitudes; each set 
had six pairs of attitude items of which one in each pair was indicated as 
an attitude held either by the driver or by the pedestrian. Presentation 
of opinions held by the driver or by the pedestrian was counterbalanced. 
The mode of presenting two sets of attitudes was taken from recent research 
by McKillip and Posavac (1972); each set contained responses which were 
:trequently endorsed (high popularir,y) and responses wh:i.ch were .Less 
frequently endorsed (low popularity attitudes). The mean endorsement 
frequencies for the subject population taken from the study by McKillip 
and Posavac were .82 and .18, respectively. By manipulating the 
endorsement. frequency of the attitudes, it was assured that most subjects 
would be attitudinally similar to an actor attributed to hold high popular 
attitude responses and different from an actor attributed to. hold low 
popular responses. 
Since any individual subject may hold unusual attitudes, it was 
necessary to check on the adequacy of this way of manipulating similarity. 
An attitude questionnaire containing 60 items (including the twelve items 
used in the study) was given to the subjects in order to assess their own 
Appendix C (where it is indicated which responses are popular and which 
are unpopular). Seventeen subjects (8 females and 9 males) did not meet 
the criterion of endorsing these items as expected and they were dropped 
from the study. 
The attitudes were presented in such a way that each set served 
equally often as similar and d.issilnilar attitude items in all combi11ations. 
The order of presentation was completely counterbalanced. (See Appendix C 
for a summary of the counterbalancing design.) 
The dependent measures. Pages six and seven of the experimental. booklet 
contained the dependent measures and the manipulation checks. The general. 
format was to ask a question and have the subjects report their responses 
on a twenty-one point bipolar scale labelled at both poles. The first 
The 
judgment extended from "she (or he) was not at al.l responsible" to "she 
(or he) was totally responsible. 11 The second question assessed attribution 
of the driver's responsibility for the accident. The judgment ranged from 
"she (or he) was not at all responsible" to'she (or he) was totally 
responsible." In question number three the size of compensation for the 
victim was determined as an alternate way of assessing the judgment of 
responsibility. l.JU,estion number four asked how foreseeable the accident 
had been. The low pole was labelled "obviously foreseeable" and the high 
pole "impossible to foresee." The remaining five judgments were 
manipulation checks. westion number five asked how similar the subject 
felt she (or he) was to the pedestrian, and in question six it was asked 
how similar the subject was to the driver. The labels in both questions 
zmw - ,. e ·•·n = J-.t 
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were "she (or he) is totaJJ.y different," to "she (or he) is the same. 11 In 
question seven it was asked how possible it was that the subject might be 
in circumstances similar to the pedestrian in the accident reported. 
~stion number eight asked how possible it was that the subject might be in 
circumstances similar to the driver in the accident reported. The rating 
was from nnever" to "easily." The ninth question asked for ratings of how 
severe they considered this incident to be. The rating was from "very 
severe" to 11inconsequential. 11 
Attitude questionnaire. The measure of subject's own attitudes was 
presented in the booklet after the dependent variables were measured. 
subjects were classified as similar to the high popular actor if they agreed 
with the high popular answers on four or more of the stimulus items. 
S'Ubjects were classifiea as dissinn.lar to ~ne low popUJ.ar actor if they 
disagreed with his responses on four of the six infrequent stimulus item 
answers. In other words, the criterion for acceptability as an experimental 
subject was four or :roore responses on the survey of attitudes which were 
the same as or different from the given attitudes of the appropriate 
stimulus person. The 6o items used in this survey of subject attitudes 
are given in Appendix E. In addition, the subjects were asked to identify 
themselves in terms of sex and age. 
Procedure 
subjects were tested in groups, mostly of size twelve. After they 
were seated in the classroom used for the experiment, they were given one 
·or the experimental booklets, which had been randomly ordered (except for 
sex or driver and pedestrian) and were asked to complete the booklet 
16 
carefully and honestly, after reading the general instructions. The subjects 
were asked to read through the booklet at a comfortable pace. After all 
subjects had finished, the experiment was fully explained to them. 
Design 
The basic design was a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial with degree of severity of 
accident (mild or serious) , similarity to the driver, and similarity to the 
pedestrian as factors. Order of assignment to conditions was blocked 
randomized in groups of eight. Since there were six males and six females 
in each treatment, sex was used as an additional factor in the analysis. 
The nine dependent measures were subjected to 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 analysis of 
variance. 
Primary manipulation checks 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
An ana1ysis of variance of the manipulation check of perceived 
similarity to the Eedestrian (question five) revealed, as desired, that the 
similar pedestrian was seen as more similar to the subject (X = 14.10) than 
the dissimilar pedestrian (X = 4.35; E = 146.52, elf = l/&>, E. ( .001). 
There was also an interaction of sex by pedestrian for perceived similarity 
to the pedestrian (E, = 9 .oo, df' = l/f30, E. < .01) • Table l contains the 
means relevant to this interaction. It can be seen that male subjects are 
more extreme in their perceptions of similarity than female subjects. The 
analysis of variance al.so yielded a significant interaction of sex by 
peci.e5i;,;d.an by drive:i:· (f_ = 4. 72, df "" l/Go, lo!. ( .05). Table:s 2 cont.aill5 tht:1 
appropriate means. This interaction shows that the tendency for males to 
report extreme perceived similarity to the pedestrian, as indicated in 
Table l, occurred primarily when the driver was dissimilar. 
The second manipulation check, question number six, dealt 'With 
perceived similarity to the driver by the subjects. The relevant means 
are shown in Table 3. The analysis of variance of this scale showed a 
significant effect for the d:rlver's actual similarity (F = 59.02,.df = l/8o, 
E. < .001). Similar drivers were seen as more similar to the subject 
(X = 13.44) than diss.imilar drivers (X = 5.90). Thus, this experimental 
manipulation was also effective. The significant interaction of pedestrian 
by driver (£: = 5.25, df = 1/00, E. < .05) indicates that subjects were 100re 
17 
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TABLE l 
Mean Perceived Similarity to the Pedestrian 
(Sex by Pedestrian Interaction) 
Actual relationship between 
subject and pedestrian attitudes 
Similar Dissimilar 
Female 12.50 5.17 
Sex of 
subject 
Male 15.71 3.54 
Note. -- 24 subjects per cell. 
19. 
TABLE 2 
Mean Perceived Similarity to the Pedestrian 
(Sex by Pedestrian by Driver Interaction) 
Actual relationship 
between subject and 
driver attitudes 
Similar 
Female 
D:i.ssiirilar 
Similar 
MaJ.e 
Dissimilar 
Actual relationship between 
subject and pedestrian attitudes 
Similar 
16.83 
Dissimilar 
8.83 
' f"'-. 4e:JV 
2.33 
Note. -- 12 subjects per cell. 
"-------~----~-------------------------------------~----~--~~ 
TABLE 3 
Mean Perceived Similarity to the Driver 
(Pedestrian by Driver Interaction) 
20. 
Actual relationship between 
subject and pedestrian attitudes 
Actual. relationship 
between subject and 
driver attitudes 
Similar 
Dlssi m.ilar 
Similar 
n.54 
Note. -- 24 subjects per cell. 
Dissimilar 
) 
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extreme in perceptions of similarity to the driver when the pedestrian was 
presented as dissimilar rather than similar to the subjects, especially 
when the driver was presented as similar. 
The third manipulation check concerned the perceived severity of the 
accident. The analysis or variance for this manipulation check yielded a 
significant main effect for severity or accident (!:, • 5.56, d.f' = 1/80, 
E. ( .05). The severe accident (X = 11.81.) was seen as more serious than 
the mild accident (X = 9.50). 
Secondary manipulation checks 
Question number seven dealt with the possibility or the subject finding 
himself (or herself) in similar circumstances· to those of the pedestrian. 
The analysis of variance revealed a significant interaction of sex by 
a.ccideut severity (!., = L..69, elf = 1/80, 2. < .or;). Table L. shows that 
females were more likely to see themselves in the mild accident than were 
males. It had been expected that the judgment of being iri similar 
circumstances as the pedestrian would have been influenced by the 
manipulation of the pedestrian's similarity; however, this effect did not 
achieve significance. 
Question number eight dealt with the possibility of the subject finding 
himself (or herself) in circumstances similar to those of the driver. The 
analysis of variance showed that subjects similar to the driver saw them-
selves as 100re likely to be in such circumstances (X = 16.67) than subjects 
dissimilar to the driver (X = lJ. 75; !'_ = 6.81, elf = l/80, E. ( .05). 
In general the manipulations seemed quite effective. However, the 
significant interactions among the independent var.tables found in the 
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TABLE 4 
Mean Perception of Being in Circumstances Similar to those 
of the Pedestrian 
(Sex by Accident Interaction) 
Actual severity or the accident 
Sex: of 
subject 
Female 
Male 
Mild 
lJ.04 
8.67 
Note. -- 24 subjects per cell. 
Severe 
12.04 
12.63 
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analyses or the manipulation checks are difficult to explain in terms of the 
actual hypothesis tested. Nevertheless, two general factors seem prominent. 
First, f ema.les seemed to give less differentiated judgments than males re-
garding perceived similarity to the pedestrian, suggesting caution in 
generalizing across sexes as urged by Thomas and Seeman (1972) • However, 
the findings here seem to be contradictory, both to their findings that 
males are universalistic and females are particularistic in judgments, and 
to the results of Shaw, Floyd, and Gwin (1971) who found that females appear 
to make greater differentiation aIOOng conditions than do men. Second, 
the contrast effect, in which subjects similar to one stimulus person in-
creased their judgments of similarity to this person as dissimilarity to 
the other stimulus person increased, ought to be kept in mind in similarity 
manipulations involving two sti.":l~US persor.s~ 
Dependent measures 
The analysis of variance of attribution or responsibility to the 
pedestrian showed a significant ma.in effect for accident severity (E., = 5.05, 
!!!. = 1/80, ~ ( .o5). subjects judged the pedestrian as :roore responsible 
for the mild accident (X = 17.10) than for the severe accident (X = 15.17). 
The analysis of variance also yielded a significant accident by driver 
interaction of ([ = 5.27, 2f. = 1/80, ~ ( .05). Table 5 indicates that the 
pedestrian was judged least responsible in the severe accident-dissimilar 
driver condition and most responsible in the mild accident-dissimilar 
driver condition. 
The driver by pedestrian interaction was also significant ([ = 6.69, 
df = 1/80, ~ ( .05). Table 6 contains these means. In the mild accident, 
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TABLE 5 
Mean Attribution ot Responsibility to the Pedestrian 
(Accident by Driver Interaction) 
Mild 
Accident 
Severe 
Relationship between subject 
and driver attitudes 
Similar Dissimilar 
16.50 
16.54 13.79 
I 
N::>te. -- 24 subjects per cell. 
TABLE 6 
Mean Attribution or Responsibility to the Pedestrian 
(Accident by Pedestrian by Driver Interaction) 
Relationship between 
subject and driver 
attitudes by accident 
severity 
Similar 
Mild 
Similar 
Severe 
Dissimilar 
Relationship between subject 
and pedestrian attitudes 
Similar Dissimilar 
17.42 15.56 
I 
.. 7 """ ...... 18.08 
.L ·:>:> 
15.33 17.75 
15.75 n.63 
Note. -- 12 subjects per cell. 
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dissimilar pedestrian and dissimilar driver condition, subjects attributed 
the ioost responsibility to the pedestrian. However, they attributed least 
responsibility when the subjects found themselves dissimilar to the 
pedestrian and to the driver and were judging the severe accident. 
Anal.ysis of the attribution of responsibility to the driver revealed a 
significant interaction of sex by accident severity (E, = 5.54, df = 1/80, 
E. < .05). Table 7 contains the means showing this interaction. This 
interaction showed that female subjects attributed ioore responsibility to 
the driver in the mild accident than in the severe accident, while male 
subjects attributed less responsibility to the driver for the mild accident 
than for the severe accident. Comparing Tables 6 and 7, it can be seen that 
. ~·· 
overall subjects attributed far ioore responsibility to the i>"~destrian 
(i = 16.14) than to the driver (X = 5. 78). This r~lo.ti.<.n.ll:litl.!' will ht; 
important in the discussion of ing;>rovements on the present design. 
The third dependent variable, compensation which the pedestrian should 
be given by the driver's insurance company, yielded a significant main 
effect for accident severity (E, = 4.50, df = 1/80, E.< .05). The subjects 
were 'Willing to award more compensation in the severe accident (X = 8.92) 
than in the mild accident (X = 6.79). 
With respect to the foreseeability of the accident, females indicated 
the accident to be roore foreseeable (X = 16.75) than male subjects (X = 14.62; 
!, = 4.61, df = 1/80, E. < .05). There was also a significant interaction 
of accident severity by pedestrian by dri var {E = 5. 36, df = 1/80, E. ( • 05) • 
·The means related to this three-way interaction are in Table 8. It is hard 
to speculate on reasons for this particular pattern since on reflection it 
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TABLE 7 
Mean Attribution of Responsibility to the Driver 
(Sex by Driver Interaction) 
Severity or the accident 
Mild Severe 
Female 6.75 5.21 
Sex of 
subject 
Male 4.13 7.04 
Note. -- 24 subjects per cell. 
Mild 
TABLE 8 
Mean Perceived Foreseeability of Accident 
(Accident by Pedestrian by Driver Interaction) 
Relationship between 
subject and driver 
attitudes by 
accident severity 
Similar 
----·- 4-
Similar 
Relationship between subject 
and pedestrian attitudes 
Silnilar Dissimilar 
18.17 
-· 
... i2~67 . . l~-~8 
15.42 17.17 
Severe 
-
Dissimilar 16.42 15.50 
Note. -- 12 subjects per cell. 
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is not clear whether subjects were estimating foreseeability for pedestrians 
or for drivers. 
To analyze the role of sex differences in regard to the dependent 
measures, scores for the dependent measures were intercorrelated, across 
levels of accident severity and of similarity, separately for female and 
male subjects. The correlations are presented in Table 9. In general, it 
may be stated that the directionality of the correlations was consistently 
identical for the sexes though attained levels of significance were not 
always comparable. Specifically, attribution of responsibility to the 
pedestrian and to the driver correlated significantly for both females 
(£ = -.54, !!!. = 46, l?. < .001) and for males (£ = -.54, !!!. = 46, l?. < .001), 
as did the correlation between attribution of responsibility to the 
pedestrian and size of compensation, females (£ = -.32, !!!. = 46, l?. < .Ol) 
and males (£ = -.53, df = 46, l?. '( .001). The positive correlation between 
attribution of responsibility to the driver and foreseeability of the accident 
was significant only for females (£ = .30, ~ = 46, l?. <: .001). The positive 
correlation between attribution of responsibility to the driver was 
significant for both females (£ = .53, !!!. = 46, l?. < .001) and males (£ = .51, 
s!!_ = 46, E. < .001). The negative correlation between attribution of 
responsibility and foreseeability of the accident was significant only for 
males (£ = -.42, d.t = 46, l?. <:., .001). When separate correlations were per-
.formed for both conditions of the accident, the directionality of the 
correlations was the same as that for overall accident comparisons. In 
general, these correlation results do not suggest that differences between 
rating of males and females in the various conditions were due to'differences 
TABLE 9 
Correlations of Dependent Measures f.)r Females and Males for 
Accident Conditions 
I Ia II Ia a IV 
a 
-.54*** I Females -.32** .30* 
Males 
-.54*** -.52*** .18 
I~ Females .53*** -.14 
Males .51*** 
--42*** 
III a Females 
-.14 
Males -.20 
t1 Represents attribution of responsibility to the Pedestrian. 
IIa Represents attribution of responsibility to the Driver. 
IIIa Represents size ot compensation to the Pedestrian. 
IVa Represents foreseeability of the Accident. 
*l? <: .05 
\,,.). 
0 
~ "<:: .01 -
-a , .OOJ. ··- I 
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in interpretation or scales. 
CHAPrER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The first hypothesis suggested for the present study was that less 
responsibility would be attributed to the similar pedestrian than to the 
dissimilar pedestrian, especially in the severe accident condition. The 
significant driver by accident interaction indicates that the pedestrian 
was judged least responsible in the severe accident-dissimilar driver 
condition. The significant accident by pedestrian by driver interaction 
seemed to be caused primarily by the low responsibility attributed to the 
pedestrian when the dissilTlilar pedestrian and dissimilar driver were 
involved in the mild accident coupled with the high responsibility 
attributed to the pedestrian when the dissimilar pedestrian and dissimilar 
driver were involved in the severe accidehC.. Ther-e lti 11.:1 clear-cn"-t pa.tterr, 
to these results which allows meaningful generalizations. ~thesis I was 
not supported. 
The second hypothesis postulated less reaponsi\)ility attr!lbuted to the 
similar driver than·to the dissimilar driver, especially in the severe 
accident condition. The data relevant to this hypothesis show that the male 
subjects attributed less responsibility to the driver in the mild accident 
than in the severe accident condition. However, female subjects attributed 
DrJre responsibility to the driver in the mild accident than in the severe 
accident condition. However, these differences were unrelated to 
·effects offers no support for the second hypothesi • 
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opposite tendency, attributing mre responsibility to the driver in the 
severe than in the mild accident conditions. 'While the data were in the 
process of being analyzed, the results of Deau:x: 1s (1972) research were 
brought to the attention or the writer. Her results indicate that the 
pennutations of sex of judge and sex of stimulus person do not lead to 
equivalent results. Inasmuch as males were judging males and females 
judging femaJ.es in the present experiment, it is unclear whether the results 
in this experiment were due to the judge's sex or the sex of the sti.nnilus 
persons. Nevertheless, Thomas and Seaman's (1972) finding that males were 
mre universalistic and females ioore particularistic in judgments does not 
seem to be applicable to judgments regarding attribution of responsibility. 
over all levels of similarity to the pedestrian and driver, both sexes 
w.:S.L"t.t h.1.ghly oompai•able ir1 their judgiuants. 
Directions for improvements in design include: (a) rewriting the 
story, (b) including heterosexual stimulus person-subject pairs, (c) control 
for age of subjects, and (d) ioore clear dependent variable wording. 
The story should be written in a different fashion, to give the 
opportunity to subjects to identify themselves according to their own 
perceptions of the external world (environment) as Kelley proposed. A 
better story would leave the question of responsibility ioore ambiguous. 
Mary B. was driving her car on her wrq to college. She 
was in a hurry, trying to get to class on time; she was 
driving at a moderate speed. Traffic at that time was 
light, and it was raining. Unexpectedly, as Mary was 
just two blocks away from campus, she recalled seeing a 
person (who turned out to be Ann c.) in front of her car. 
Immediately Mary stepped on her brakes in an attempt to 
atop her car. However, Mary did not stop fast enough 
and hit Ann. 
35 . 
Another alternative for changing the reports that may be helpful is to 
present subjects two different stories of the accident, one story as told 
by the driver and the second as told by the pedestrian. This will permit 
the study of another possible source of bias in judging and ~ttributing 
responsibility to the parties involved. It may also allow the subjects' 
perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and opinions more strongly to inflmnce 
the judgments. 
On a more general methodological. level, the present study suggests 
that results based on male-only and female-only samples are not equivalent. 
Therefore, in order to improve generalizability, (a) subject males should 
judge males, (b) subject males should judge females, (c) subject females 
should judge fema:Les, and (d) subject females should judge males, in order 
to clarify sex distinctions. 
The age variable of the subjects should be consistent with the age of 
the stimUlus person. In the present study, the female subjects' ages 
ranged from 18 to 47, and the ma.le subjects' ages ranged from 18 to 45. 
The subjects who participated in the present study were all summer school 
students. Such age differences could easily have obscured the manipulations 
of attitude similarity. 
Finally, the meaning of the foreseeability dependent variable was 
1lllclear, and should be rewritten into two qmstions. One would deal with 
the possibility of the driver foreseeing the accident and the other with 
the possibility of the pedestrian foreseeing it. 
APPENDIX A 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
DEPARTMEm' OF PSYCHOIDGY 
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY 
Maey people are cal.led upon to make decisions 
concerning how responsible another person is for his 
behavior or for the results of his behavior. The 
processes people employ to make such decisions are not 
clearly understood because most outcomes are partially 
caused by the people involved and partially caused by 
the unforeseen situation. Some situations are easily 
foreseeable while others, of course, are very unlikely 
to be foreseen. Whether you are a committee chairman, 
a jury member, a roommate, a teacher, a supervisor, a 
parent, a judge, a consumer, etc., there are many 
situations which require you to make informal decisions 
concerning the degree of a person's responsibility for 
some behavior or outcome. However, the level of 
respo!'..sibility ror various outcomes mllSt ba liete1111iooci 
before further research into the process of making 
responsibility judgments can be conducted. 
Please read the following case report carefully 
and report the judgments requested. Inasmuch as 
attribution of responsibility to other people for their 
behaviors and outcomes is an important type of judgment 
for many kinds of human interactions, your work is a 
necessary preliminary to further research. Thus, a 
careful consideration of the judgments you report would 
be sincerely appreciated. 
· Thank you for your cooperation. 
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APPENDIX B 
STORY 
i - Severe Accident, femaJ.es 
ii - Mild Accident, .ferr.ia.les 
iii - Severe Accident, males 
iv - Mild Accident, males 
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Severe Accident 
Mary B. was driving her car on her way to college. 
She was not in a hur?"7, she was driving at a mderate 
speed. Traffic at that time was light, the weather was 
clear, and visibility was good. SUddenly Ann C., also a 
local college student, stepped between two parked cars 
and into the path of Mary's car. Immediately Mary 
stepped on her brakes in an attempt to avoid hitting Ann. 
lbwever, Mary did not stop fast enough and she hit Ann. 
Ann was taken to the hospital in an ambulance where 
X-rays revealed that her right leg was broken. She was 
also treated for cuts and bruises and remained in the 
hospital for ten days. 
Mild Accident 
Mary B. was driving her car on her way to col+ege. 
She was n:>t in a hurry, she was driving at a iooderate 
speed. Traffic at that time was light, the weather was 
clear, and visibility was good. suddenly Ann c., also 
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a local college student, stepped from between two parked 
cars and into the path of Mary's car. Immediately Mary 
stepped on her brakes in an attempt to avoid hitting Ann. 
However, Mary did not stop fast enough and she ltl.t Ann. 
Ann was taken to the hospital in a police car 
wh0 re X-rays r9vealed no bone darn.age. .ti'ter .A!'..n was 
treated for bruises on her right leg, she went home 
under her own power. 
Severe Accident 
Jack B. was driving his car on his way to col~ege. 
He was not in a hurry, he was driving at a mderate speed. 
Traffic at that time was light, the weather was clear, 
and visibility was good. SUddenly Paul C., also a 
local college student, stepped from between two parked 
cars and into the path of Jack's car. Immediately 
Jack stepped on his brakes in an attempt to avoid 
hitting Paul. However, Jack did :oot. stop fast enough 
and he hit Paul. 
P.li:ttl was t.a.ken to t.he hoapit..al in an ambulance 
where X-rays revealed that his right leg was broken. 
He was also treated for cuts and bruises and remained 
in the hospital for ten days. 
Mild Accident 
Jack B. was driving his car on his way to college. 
He was not in a hurry, he was driving at a moderate speed. 
Traffic at that time was light, the weather was clear, 
and visibility was good. Suddenly PauJ. c., also a 
local. college student, stepped from between two parked 
cars and into the path of Jack's car. Immediately 
Jack stepped on his brakes in an attempt to avoid 
hitting Paul. However, Jack did not stop fast enough 
and he hit Paul. 
Paul was ~l~cn tc the !"..ocpi tel in a police car 
where X-rays revealed no bone damage. After Paul was 
treated for bruises on his right leg, he went home 
under his own power. 
APPENDIX C 
i - Presentation Design 
ii - Instructions 
iii - Attitudes - Set "A" 
iv - Attitudes - Set 11B11 
The attitudes were presented in such a way that 
the driver and the pedestrian were represented equall.y 
often by the two sets of attitudes. The order of 
presentation was completely counterbalanced. Thus, we 
had the following sets: 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
Similar Driver 
A - High Popular 
endorsements 
B - High Popular 
endorsements 
Similar Driver 
A - High Popular 
sndorse."l".ent::: 
B - !Dw Popular 
endorsements 
Di.ss:im:ilar Driver 
A - !Dw Popular 
endorsements 
B - Low Popular 
endorsements 
Dissimilar Driver 
A - Low Popular 
endorsements 
B - Low Popular 
endorsements 
S:im:ilar Pedestrian 
B - High Popular 
endorsements 
A - High Popular 
endorsements 
DissintiJ.ar Pedestrian 
B - Low Popular 
endorze~nt:: 
A - High Popular 
endorsements 
Similar Pedestrian 
B - High Popular 
endorsements 
A - High Popular 
endorsements 
Diss:im:ilar Pedestrian 
B - !Dw Popular 
endorsements 
A - Low Popular 
endorsements 
In order to help you make a f'air judgment of 
this case, it is necessary for you to know something 
of the character of the persons involved. It has been 
shown that a synopsis of attitudes on a number of 
important topics helps subjects to formulate more 
accurate impressions. 
45. 
On the following two sheets of paper, then, are two 
sets of opinions held by the driver or by the pedestrian. 
The items have been selected to be representative or the 
at ti tu.ties of each ::?'=':':'Son.., even thol'eh t,h~y P-J:'"" only ~-
:::.-r .. fil ~~"i;>le of each one 1 ~ total cpinic!'..s. 
Guided by this knowledge, please answer the 
questions about the driver and those about the 
predestrian. 
Attitudes - Set "A" 
(High endorsement responses circled) 
1. © I am in .favor of .freshmen being allowed to 
have cars on campus. · 
2. 
3. 
4. 
B. 
A. 
@ 
@ 
. B. 
A. 
I am against freshmen being allowed to have 
cars on campus. 
I f'eel that people should usually go along with 
group opinion even if' they disagree with it. 
I f'eel that people should usually ignore group 
opinion i.f they disagree with it. 
I am in favor of st.udent social activism. 
I am against student social activism • 
In gcncr~, I a,171 cg.::.inst nccldr..g nr..d pcttir.g 
among couples in college. 
~ In general, I am in favor of necking and petting 
among couples in college. 
5. G I believe that the .father should discipline 
the children in the .f am.ily. 
B. I believe that the mother should discipline 
the children in the family. 
6. A. I believe that fresh air and daily exercise are 
mt important. 
G) I believe that .fresh air and daily exercise are 
important. 
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Attitudes - Set "B11 
(High endoresment responses circled) 
1. @ I enjoy sports. 
B. I dislike sports. 
2. A. I believe that girls should be allowed to date 
before they are in high school. 
G.;) I believe that girls should not be allowed to 
date until they are in high school. 
3. 0 I believe that rooney is not one or the ioost ~important goals in life. 
B. I believe that money is one of the m:>st 
in¥ortant goals in life. 
4. A. 
B. 
6. A. 
In general, I am against an emphasis on the 
social aspects of college life. 
In general, I am in favor of an emphasis on 
the social aspects of college life. 
I enjoy doing creative work. 
I dislike doing creative work. 
I am in favor of the draft. 
® I am opposed to the draft. 
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APPENDIX D 
SCALE 
i - Manipulation Checks for females and males 
ii - Dependent Measures for f ema.les and males 
Please circle the number on the scale which best 
represents your judgment on the information you 
have just been given. 
l. D:> you feel that Ann c. (the pedestrian) was 
responsible for the accident in which she was hurt? 
49. 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
She was not at 
all responsible 
She was totally 
responsible 
2. D:> you feel that Mary B. (the driver) was responsible 
for the accident in which Ann c. was hurt? 
1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14·-15--16--11--18--19--20--21 
She was not at 
all responsible 
She was totally 
responsible 
3. Relatively speaking, what size of compensation 
should be given to the pedestrian, Ann, by Mary's 
insurance company? 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
Very small · Very large 
4. How foreseeable was this incident? 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
Obviously 
foreseeable 
5. How similar do you think the pedestrian, Ann c., 
is to you? 
J.mpossible 
to foresee 
.l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--lh--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
She is totally 
different 
She is the 
same 
6. How similar do you think the driver; Mary B., 
is to you? 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
She is totally 
different 
7. How possible do you think it is that you might 
be in circumstances similar to those of the 
pedestrian, Ann? 
She is the 
same 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
Never 
8. How possible do you think it is that you might 
be in circumstances similar to those of the driver, 
Mar-.r B.? 
Easily 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
Never Easily 
9. How severe do you consider this incident to 1;3? 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
Very severe Inconsequential 
Please circle the n1.lil1ber on the scale which best 
represents your judgment on the information you 
have just been given. 
l. lb you feel that Paul c. (the pedestrian) was 
responsible for the accident in which he was hurt? 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
He was not at 
all responsible 
He was tot~ 
responsible 
2. D::> you feel that Jack B. (the driver) was respon-
sible for the accident in which Paul c. was hurt? 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
He was not at 
all responsible 
He was totally 
responsible 
3. Relatively speaking, what size of compensation 
should be given to the pedestrian, Paul, by 
Jack's insurance company? 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
Very smaJ.l Ver-y large 
4. How foreseeable was this incident? 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
Obviously 
foreseeable 
Impossible 
to foresee 
5. How similar do you think the pedestrian, Paul c., 
is to you? 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
He is totally 
different 
He is the 
same 
6. How similar do you think· the driver, Jack B. , 
is to you? 
52. 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
He is totally 
different 
7. How possible do you think it is that you might 
be in circumstances similar to those of the 
pedestrian, Paul? 
He is the 
same 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
Never 
8. How possible do you think it is that you might 
bo in oir::~-:r~t.~ccs ;:;it"ri.il~ to tho~c of th~ dz! var J 
Jack n.? 
l!asily 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
Never l!asily 
9. How severe do you consider this incident to be? 
l--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9--10--11--12--13--14--15--16--17--18--19--20--21 
Very severe Inconsequential 
APPENDIX E 
i - Instructions 
ii - Su...""V'ey cf At.titud~!:! 
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The next part of the experiment is an attempt to 
get at opinions which you yourself hold, which might have 
influenced your ratings in the first part of the 
experiment. Your answer sheet is anonymous and there 
is no way that your answers could be traced to you. 
However, because of the importance of this aspect of 
the study, your frank and careful answers to the 
questions are illlpor-eant. 
After the completion of this part of the experiment, 
any- question which you have will be answered. 
Remember, the success of this research depends on 
the care with which you answer these questions. 
SURVEY OF ATTITUDES 
Class: Fr. Soph. Jr. Sr. 
- - - -
Age: Sex: 
Please indicate yaur attitude toward each of the topics below. Mark on 
your answer sheet· either "A11 or 11B11 whichever is the more accurate 
description of your attitude on the subject. 
l. A. I am against fraternities and sororities as they usually function. 
B. I am in favor of fraternities and sororities as they usually fmiction. 
2. A. I enjoy western ioovies and television programs. 
B. I dislike western ioovies and television programs. 
3. A. In general., I am in favor of undergraduates getting married. 
B. In general., I am against undergraduates getting married. 
4. A. I dislike situation comedies. 
B. I enj()y· ai·tualiion co11i6tlies. 
'· 
A. I believe that there is a God. 
B. I believe that there is no God. 
6. A. I feel that university professors are indifferent to student needs. 
B. I feel that university professors are concerned atout student. needs. 
7. A. In general., I am against necking and petting among couples in 
college. 
B. In general, I am in favor of necking and petting aroong couples in 
college. 
8. A. In general, I am in favor of siooking. 
B. In general, I am against SIOOlci.ng. 
9. A. Racial integration in public schools is a mistake, and I am against 
it. 
B. Racial integration in public schools is a good plan, and I am in 
favor of it. 
10. 
ll. 
12. 
13. 
J.4. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
I enjoy comedians who use satire. 
I dislike comedians who use satire. 
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I feel that it is better if people usually act on impulse. 
I feel that it is better if people usually engage in a careful 
consideration of alternatives. · 
In general, I am against an emphasis on the social aspects of 
college life. 
In general, I am in favor of an emphasis on the social aspects of 
college life. 
I am in favor of most birth control techniques. 
I am opposed to m::>st birth control techniques. 
I dislike classical nrusic. 
B. I enjoy classical music. 
i;:;.. A. In ga:;.1e::ra.l, ::: a.ill in favor vf ccl:!..Ggc stud.sJ::..ts drinid.ng alcoholic 
beve.:t'ages. 
B. In general, I am opposed to college students drinld.ng alcoholic 
beverages. 
16. A. I believe that the American way of life is not the best. 
B. I believe that the American way of life is the best~ 
17. A. I enjoy sports. 
B. I dislike sports. 
18. A. In general, I am opposed to premarital sex relations. 
B. In general, I am in favor of premarital sex relations. 
19. A. I enjoy science fiction. 
B. I dislike science fiction. 
20. A. I believe that m::>ney is not one of the m::>st important goals in life. 
B. I believe that money is one of the 100st inq)ortant goals in life. 
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21. A. I am in favor of the university grading system as it now exists. 
B. I am opposed to the university grading system as it now exists. 
22. A. I prefer the Deroocratic party. 
B. I prefer the Republican party. 
23. A. I feel that people should usually ignore group opinion if they 
disagree with it. 
B. I feel that people should usually go along with group opinion even 
if they disagree with it. 
24. A. I believe that my church represents the one true religion. 
B. I believe that no church represents the one true religion. 
25. A. I dislike musical comedies. 
B. I enjoy musical comedies. 
26. A. I believe that preparedness for war will not tend to precipitate 
war. 
B. I believe that preparedness for war will tend to precipitate war. 
27. A. I am opposed to increased welfare legislation. 
B. I am in favor of increased welfare legislation. 
28. A. I enjoy doing creative work. 
B. I dislike doing creative work. 
29. A. I believe that girls should be allowed to date before they are in 
high school. 
B. I believe that girls should not be allowed to date until they are 
in high school. 
30. A. I believe that Red China should not be admitted to the U.N. 
B. I believe that Red China should be admitted to the U.N. 
31. A. I dislike reading novels. 
B. I enjoy reading novels. 
5.8 
32. A. I am opposed to socialized medicine as it operates in Great 
Britain. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
B. I am in favor or socialized medicine as it operates in Great 
Britain. 
A. I feel that war is sometimes necessary to solve world problems. 
B. I feel that war is never necessary to solve world problems. 
A. I am opposed to a state income tax. 
B. I am in favor of a state income tax. 
A. I am opposed to the custom of tipping. 
B. I am in favor of the custom of tipping. 
A. I enjoy keeping pets. 
B. I dislike keeping pets. 
A. I enjoy foreign m::>vies. 
T) 
V• I dislike foreign movies: 
38. A. I am against strict disciplining of children. 
B. I am in favor of strict disciplining of children. 
39. A. I believe that parents should provide financial help to young 
married couples. 
B. I believe that parents should not provide financial help to young 
married couples. 
40. A. I am in favor of freshmen being allowed to have cars on campus. 
B. I am against freshmen being allowed to have cars on campus. 
41. A. I am in favor of requiring students to learn a foreign language. 
B. I am opposed to requiring students to learn a foreign language. 
42. A. I believe it is very important for a person to have a college 
education in order to be successful. 
B. I believe that it is not very important for a person to have a 
college education in order to be successful. 
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43. A. I believe that fresh air and daily exercise are not important. 
B. I believe that fresh air and daily exercise are important.· 
44. A. I believe that the father should discipline the children in the 
family. 
B. I believe that the mother should discipline the children in the 
family. 
45. A. I am opposed to the federal govermnent's buildup of nuclear arms. 
B. I am in favor of the federal government's buildup of nuclear arms. 
46. A. I believe that the federal government should provide community 
bomb shelters. 
B. I believe that individuals should provide their own bomb shelters. 
47. A. I am opposed to divorce. 
B. I am in favor of divorce. 
48. A. I enjoy gardening. 
B. I dislike gardening. 
49. A. I enjoy dancing. 
B. I dislike dancing. 
5o. A. I am in favor of the draft. 
B. I am opposed to the draft. 
51. A. I believe that women are not taldng too aggressive a role in 
society today. 
B. I believe that women are taldng too aggressive a role in society 
today. 
52. A. I believe that the man in the family should handle the finances. 
B. I believe that the woman in the family should handle the finances. 
53. A. I dislike looking at exhibitions of modern art. 
B. I enjoy looking at exhibitions of modern art. 
6o 
54. A. I am in favor of women pursuing careers. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
B. I am opposed to women pursuing careers. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
I believe that men adjust to stress better than women. 
I believe that men do not adjust to stress better than women. 
I feel that Loyola is not too preprof essionally oriented. 
I feel that Loyola is too preprof essionally oriented. 
I believe that Chicago is not a progressive city. 
I believe that Chicago is a progressive city. 
I believe that a Congressmen should follow his own convictions when 
they conflict with those of the majority of his constituents. 
I believe that a Congressman should not follow his own convictions 
when they conflict with those of the majority of his constituents. 
I prefer that none of my required courses be on a pass-fail basis. 
I prerer that some or my required courses be on a pass-fail basis. 
I am in favor of student social activism. 
B. I am against student social activismo 
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